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WHAT THE GREAT RECESSION REVEALED ABOUT TAXATION BY
CITATION AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
Dick M. Carpenter II, Chelsea Lawson & Courtney Deuser*

ABSTRACT
In recent years, the issue of “taxation by citation” has grown in national
prominence. It is generally defined as municipal revenue generation through fines and
fees that transcends a clear relationship to public health and safety and serves more as a
revenue generating device. According to critics, taxation by citation creates conflicts of
interest, violates the rights of those with low income, and distorts law enforcement
priorities. Municipal leaders reject such criticisms by denying taxation by citation even
exists. To date, research findings have been mixed on whether cities practice taxation by
citation. This Article examines whether there is a relationship between fines and fees
revenue generation and broader economic trends. If there is a relationship, that would
suggest cities do, indeed, use municipal ordinance enforcement and the resulting fines
and fees as a means of revenue generation beyond public health and safety. We use a
panel of 1,471 cities from the Census of Governments spanning 2005 through 2017,
which captures the Great Recession of 2008. Fixed-effects regression analyses indicate
a significant relationship between the fines and fees revenue trend and the Great
Recession. We conclude by recommending legal reforms to eliminate the financial
incentives to engage in taxation by citation. These include eliminating municipal
courts, capping the revenue cities may retain from ordinance enforcement, and ensuring
judicial independence from municipal executive and legislative branches.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines fines and fees revenue generation by cities
and proposes legal reforms based on those findings. Specifically, we
study whether there is a relationship between fines and fees revenue
generation and broader economic trends as represented by the recession of 2008. Upon finding a significant relationship, we discuss how
reforming certain state laws may help curb municipal ordinance enforcement expressly for budget-balancing purposes.
Generating revenue through traffic tickets and municipal code enforcement has a long history, but recently the practice has come under
increased scrutiny due to concerns that it may be transcending public
health and safety goals and instead serving primarily as a revenuegenerating device. Some scholars call this phenomenon “taxation by citation.” 1
When a city generates a large percentage of revenue from fines and
fees, that may signal taxation by citation. There is not yet an agreedupon definition of “excessive” in the generation of fines and fees revenue, but one observer has suggested that a threshold of 10% of a city’s
revenue from fines and fees may be cause for concern. 2 Indeed, Governing magazine set 10% as its threshold when studying cities engaged in
taxation by citation. 3
For critics, there are legal and social problems associated with taxation by citation including: (1) conflicts of interest; (2) violation of the
rights of people with low income; and (3) distortions in law enforcement
priorities. First, because municipal courts are often funded by the fines,
and particularly fees, generated by citations issued in their cities, 4 this
1. See, e.g., Min Su, Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines,
80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 36 (2020); C. Jarrett Dieterle, Citation Nation, CITY J. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://
www.city-journal.org/html/citation-nation-15093.html [https://perma.cc/5S2H-PVYB]; Fred Foldvary,
Taxation by Citation, PROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.progress.org/articles/taxation-by-citation
[https://perma.cc/PLE8-UA95]; Josh Mitchell, Sen. Schatz Reports Progress Was Made in Legislative Session,
THE MISSOURIAN (May 21, 2015), https://www.emissourian.com/news/state/sen-schatz-reportsprogress-was-made-in-legislative-session/article_9b6beb81-aa90-5f5f-951a-ff3cace4d969.html [https://
perma.cc/8KQT-74JL]; Melissa Bailey, “No Taxation Through Citation!”, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 3,
2012, 7:46 AM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/red_light_
cameras_protest/ [https://perma.cc/KM3G-WHZE].
2. Andria Simmons, Traffic Tickets: Atlanta’s Ticket Traps: Slow Down or Pay, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/transportation/atlanta-ticket-traps-slow-down-pay
/6JZfycaeaKQ3jYJGRxtHII [https://perma.cc/Z3PL-R5DZ].
3. See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A Special Report, GOVERNING (Aug. 16, 2019), https://
www.governing.com/archive/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html [https://perma.cc/CX33-NPVM].
4. Dick Carpenter, Ricard Pochkhanawala & Mindy Menjou, Municipal Fines and Fees: A 50State Survey of State Laws, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/report/fines-and-fees-home/ [https://
perma.cc/27P3-F46L] (last visited June 30, 2021).
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may create conflicts of interest. This seems counter to U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that judges ought not preside over cases in which convictions can produce financial benefits either for the judge directly or
for the city. 5 The same expectation applies to prosecutors. 6
Second, civil rights violations can occur by penalizing poverty. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor described the incarceration of poor people
for nonpayment of fines and fees as “fundamentally unfair” absent the
exploration of community service, installment payments, or other alternative sentences. 7 Incarcerating people for the inability to pay fines
and fees has been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
since the 1970s. 8 Yet, the practice continues. 9
Third, distortion of law enforcement priorities can occur when raising revenue is municipalities’ primary motivation for creating or enforcing ordinances. 10 This, too, has generated court opinions. Paying
enforcement expenses and deterring violations through monetary sanctions are legitimate, 11 but revenue production is not. 12 As one court cautioned, “it must be remembered that courts generally, and traffic courts
in particular, are not collection agencies and should not be made
such.” 13
Despite these legal opinions, recent evidence suggests that municipalities continue to view citations primarily as a source of revenue.14
The most prominent example is Ferguson, Missouri. After the 2014

5. See Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–62 (1972); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 535 (1927).
6. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980).
7. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983).
8. See id.; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
9. See Timothy Williams, Courts Sidestep the Law, and South Carolina’s Poor Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/south-carolina-jail-no-lawyer.html
[https://perma.cc/YJH2-MCYK].
10. Richard A. Ginkowski, Beyond Ferguson: Community-Based or Cash-Register Justice?, 33 CRIM.
JUST. 14 (2018).
11. Vill. of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
12. State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 201 N.W.2d 778, 781 n.2 (Wis. 1972).
13. Id. at 784.
14. See Tia Mitchell, Judge: Lawsuit Against Doraville over Tickets, Fees Can Continue, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/judge-lawsuit-againstdoraville-over-tickets-fees-can-continue/Ox9nDMs5frOgSS5QXAfk8K/ [https://perma.cc/W8G6GZVR]; see also Jessica Karins, Pagedale Agrees to Consent Decree to Stop Frivolously and Illegally Ticketing
Residents, ST. LOUIS AM. (May 30, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/pagedaleagrees-to-consent-decree-to-stop-frivolously-and-illegally/artcle_c8fb8060-6443-11e8-a01b8b545946b9c7.html [https://perma.cc/9GDG-ZRUQ]; Tia Mitchell, Lawsuit Says Doraville Budget Relies Too Heavily on Fines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 30, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/lawsuitsays-doraville-budget-relies-too-heavily-fines/6Ff8riVSV9hR6XOWFuRGuM/ [https://perma.cc/
3PB4-QJ2P].
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shooting of Michael Brown and the protests that ensued, a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation found that the city’s aggressive
revenue-generating activities through code enforcement contributed
significantly to the social tensions present in the city before Brown’s
death. 15 During the four years leading up to Brown’s shooting, despite
being a city with a population of about 21,000 people, Ferguson issued
90,000 citations, typically for nonserious 16 offenses. 17
Ferguson, however, is by no means an isolated case. In a ranking of
cities across the country in terms of their fines and fees revenue generation, Ferguson came in at only number eighteen. 18 It ranked below cities distributed throughout the country, including in Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, Missouri, New York, Utah, and Tennessee. 19 Moreover, results from empirical analyses strongly suggest that the revenue generation of many cities exceeds levels that would be expected if codes were
enforced primarily for the purpose of public safety. 20 Although illustrative, such examples are just that: examples. Systematic, empirical
scholarship on taxation by citation is nascent. Advocacy organizations
are producing research on the topic, but they tend to be legal studies, 21
fiscal administration analyses, 22 policy reports, 23 or case studies. 24 Empirical research relevant to the topic of this article is limited.

15. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–6 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police
_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC96-APJW] [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEP’T].
16. See id. at 3–7 (providing examples of “serious offenses” like assault, driving while intoxicated, and stealing; listing traffic violations as an example of a nonserious offense).
17. Id. at 7–8.
18. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 21–22 (2017), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory
_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z27K-45LU]; Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016), https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/ [https://
perma.cc/4C3K-7V94].
19. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 18; Kopf, supra note 18.
20. See Daniel Hummel, Traffic Tickets: Public Safety Concerns or Budget Building Tools, 47 ADMIN.
& SOC’Y 298 (2015); see also Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any
Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509 (2009).
21. See, e.g., Dick M. Carpenter II, Richard Pochkanawala & Mindy Menjou, Municipal Fines
and Fees: A 50-State Survey of State Laws, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://
finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/municipal-fines-and-fees-a-50-state-survey-of-state-laws/
[https://perma.cc/R34J-8382].
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM CROZIER, BRANDON GARRETT & THOMAS MAHER, DUKE L. CTR. FOR SCI. & JUST.,
THE EXPLOSION OF UNPAID CRIMINAL FINES AND FEES IN NORTH CAROLINA (2020), https://
sites.law.duke.edu/justsciencelab/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/04/CSJ-Criminal-Fines-and-Feesin-NC-v.7.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7X6-2ZRK]; MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAURENBROOKE EISEN & NOAH ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES
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I. PRIOR RESEARCH FINDINGS
In examining the extent to which economic conditions may be related to municipal collection of fines and fees, at least one author has
found no relationship between fiscal conditions, such as municipal tax
revenue, and fines and fees generation. Singla et al. used a sample of
ninety-three California cities spanning from 2010 to 2014 to examine if
racial/ethnic composition, fiscal condition, and public safety were predictors of taxation by citation. 25 Results indicated no significant relationship between fines and fees revenue and fiscal conditions or public
safety metrics. 26
Strikingly, however, a greater number of empirical findings suggest
a revenue motivation behind municipal fines and fees behavior in the
form of significant relationships between fiscal circumstances and fines
and fees revenue. In some states, policy changes at the state level have
appeared to compel municipalities to seek revenue through fines and
fees. For example, Massachusetts instituted policies in 1980 that required property taxes to remain low, although residents in cities could
vote to override the state policies and enact higher taxes in their own
municipalities. 27 Makowsky and Stratmann examined the extent to
which municipalities responded to fiscal stress by pursuing revenue
through traffic citations. 28 Results indicated that drivers had a 26 percentage point “higher probability of being fined when stopped in municipalities where voters rejected an override referendum.”29 Makowsky

AND FINES: A FISCAL ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES AND TEN COUNTIES (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org

/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final5.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NWV-7PN4].
23. See, e.g., SHARON BRETT & MITALI NAGRECHA, HARV. L. SCH. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM,
PROPORTIONATE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM (2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3759204.
24. See, e.g., MYESHA BRADEN, LEAH WATSON, TALIA GILBERT & JASON ENOS, LAWS.’ COMM. FOR
C.R. UNDER L., TOO POOR TO PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES
POVERTY & MASS INCARCERATION (2019), https://indd.adobe.com/view/f3b39ab5-1da5-409e-97a6a0b060d2f578 [https://perma.cc/DH5G-GPKJ]; DICK M. CARPENTER II, KYLE SWEETLAND & JENNIFER
MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUST., THE PRICE OF TAXATION BY CITATION: CASE STUDIES OF THREE GEORGIA
CITIES THAT RELY HEAVILY ON FINES AND FEES (2019), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10
/Taxation-by-Citation-FINAL-USE.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TUP-VJBD]; NEILY SEALY, ACADIA ROHER
& WONDER LOWE, ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING: HOW INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES KEEP
ARKANSANS IN DEBT (2020), https://237995-729345-1-raikfcquaxqncofqfm.stackpathdns.com/wp-content
/uploads/2020/01/Cant-Win-For-Losing-ACI-Debt-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MDZ-E2PE].
25. Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and Revenue:
Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 1132 (2019).
26. Id. at 1146–49.
27. Singla et al., supra note 25.
28. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20.
29. Id. at 517.

898

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:4

and Stratmann concluded, “[t]his finding is consistent with the political
economy model’s prediction that fiscal distress leads to higher speeding
fines.” 30 In a subsequent analysis, the authors further found that passage of an override referendum led to a drop in the number of traffic citations written overall by 14.3 tickets. 31
Like Massachusetts, California voters in 1978 adopted Proposition
13 to restrict property tax rates. 32 Dr. Sanghee Park gathered finance
data from fifty-seven California counties spanning from 2000 to 2010
to determine the extent to which governments turned to fines and fees
during periods of fiscal stress. 33 Results indicated that for every 1% increase in the county unemployment rate, there was a 0.32% increase in
the overall non-tax revenue, and for every one-dollar decrease in average housing price, the overall non-tax revenue increased by 0.015%.34
Public finance expert Dr. Min Su performed a similar analysis on fiftyseven California counties between 2004 and 2015, and found that a 10
percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year was associated
with a forty to forty-two cent increase in per capita traffic fines in the
current year. 35 As Su described the effect: “Considering that the average
per capita traffic fine for all counties is $4.16, this increase is approximately 10 percent of counties’ average per capita traffic fines.” 36
Other authors have found similar effects in states without property
tax reforms. Data from ninety-six North Carolina counties from 1990 to
2003 indicated that for every 1% increase in the unemployment rate,
there was a .08% increase in traffic tickets. 37 Traffic tickets increased
even more when municipalities reported negative revenue growth in
the previous year. A 10% revenue growth decrease brought an increase
in traffic tickets of 6.4%. 38 Finally, Hummel’s nationwide study found a
significant relationship between state credit ratings and traffic ticket
queries on Google (a proxy for traffic tickets), although he found no relationship between unemployment and traffic ticket queries. 39
30. Id.
31. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How CashStrapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 863, 876 (2011).
32. What Is Proposition 13?, CAL. TAX DATA, https://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/Prop13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NF7X-JK53] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
33. See Sanghee Park, Local Revenue Structure Under Economic Hardship: Reliance on Alternative
Revenue Sources in California Counties, 43 LOC. GOV’T STUD. 645 (2017).
34. Id. at 657.
35. Su, supra note 1.
36. Id. at 42.
37. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions
and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 83 (2009).
38. Id. at 87.
39. Hummel, supra note 20, at 310–13.
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Public officials routinely deny any revenue motivation, instead
pointing to the public safety rationale. 40 Yet, Singla et al. found no relationships between public safety metrics and fines and fees generation. 41
Other research, however, suggests there may in fact be such be a relationship. An analysis of data collected from the Massachusetts Highway
Department and Highway Safety Division from April 2001 through January 2003 found 100 extra tickets per month per community led to 14.3
fewer car crashes. 42 A study of nationwide data spanning 2008 to 2010
found states that issued more tickets per capita saw fewer fatal car accidents. 43 And in a study of Massachusetts traffic ticket data from November and December 2002, Luca found that a 1% increase in tickets issued led to a 0.28% decline in motor vehicle accidents. 44
Thus, a lively and important debate continues about the extent to
which public officials pursue fines and fees primarily as a revenue device. Although the studies cited above provide valuable findings, fines
and fees are an important policy topic that would benefit from additional scrutiny. We do so with several unique contributions.
First, we use a nationwide panel of municipalities drawn from the
Census of Governments. As Hummel noted, much of the prior literature focuses on case studies, such as certain localities or cities, and “[i]t
would be much more generalizable to expand those analyses to include
multiple communities across the United States covering the 50 states.” 45
The sample is large—with almost 1,500 cities and towns—and it is diverse, ranging from small communities of approximately 100 residents
to the nation’s largest cities. We also use a long panel, spanning 2005 to
2017. This is particularly relevant to our examination of the relationship
between economic conditions and fines and fees revenue generation,
given the years of the Great Recession fall in the middle of the panel.

40. See Simmons, supra note 2; see also Andria Simmons, Traffic Tickets: Some Cities Use Interstates as Cash Registers, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 10, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/traffictickets-some-cities-use-interstates-cash-registers/PULjG07fwkFbQUadT4YGvL/ [https://perma.cc
/WU7Q-X4NY] [hereinafter Traffic Tickets]; Carrie Teegardin, Georgia Traffic Courts Taking a Bite out of
Tax Refunds, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/georgiatraffic-courts-taking-bite-out-tax-refunds/CoHjEwRntiGTm2yN6R7v2N/ [https://perma.cc/63M4MCEA].
41. Singla et al., supra note 25.
42. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 31, at 879.
43. Hummel, supra note 20, at 319.
44. Dara Lee Luca, Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 85, 88 (2014).
45. Hummel, supra note 20, at 314.
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II. METHODS
Similar to Singla et al., 46 our study is guided by the primary research question: is there a significant relationship between fines and
fees revenue and the Great Recession?
A. Data, Sample & Variables
Like Sances and You’s cross-sectional study, 47 our data came from
the Census of Governments (CoG) maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau and the American Community Survey (ACS). 48 The CoG is an annual collection of descriptive, employment, and finance data from
states, counties, municipalities, and special districts, such as school
districts and water districts. In years ending in 2 and 7, the data represent a census; all other years represent a sample. We use community
characteristics from the ACS as control variables in our analyses.
The CoG is not available as a panel, so we constructed one by pooling data from all years spanning 2005 through 2017. Most years collect
data from a sample rather than a census of municipalities. To create a
balanced panel where all cities appear in all years, we retained in our
sample only those municipalities that appeared in all thirteen years of
data, which resulted in a sample of 1,471 cities. 49 We further limited the
46. Singla et al., supra note 25.
47. Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation
and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090 (2017).
48. Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys
/cog.html [https://perma.cc/FN4U-SBJJ] (last visited June 5, 2021); American Community Survey (ACS),
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs [https://perma.cc/S3RK-JU6S]
(last visited June 5, 2021).
49. Methodology, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/govfinances/technical-documentation/methodology.html [https://perma.cc/MV85-A2AM] (last visited
Apr. 16, 2021) . We dropped 10,314 municipalities to create the balanced panel. Excluded cities had
smaller percentages of persons of color (20% versus 29% in sample cities), slightly higher mean incomes ($51,527 versus $50,156), and were smaller (mean population 8,383 versus 80,047). This
means the panel dataset we created is biased toward larger municipalities. In creating the sample
in non-census years, certain municipalities always receive an invitation to submit data (participation is voluntary, but annual response rates are approximately 90%). These include, among others,
larger cities (e.g., populations greater than 75,000) and municipalities with revenues above a certain threshold. Moreover, the Census of Government’s use of a cut-off sampling methodology reduces the number of small municipalities in the sample. This is intended to reduce respondent
burden and processing costs for small municipalities with limited human and fiscal resources.
Finally, each year the Census of Governments uses imputation to fill in missing or spurious data.
In the 2016 data, for example, 18.7% of the data points we used in this study were imputed. Missingness occurs primarily due to nonresponse. Spurious data are identified by comparing responses
within an annual dataset or between years. Inconsistencies in responses that exceed certain
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sample to only cities and towns, thereby excluding counties and special
districts, and only to those municipalities that reported judicial expenditures. The latter criterion was designed to ensure that the sample included only cities and towns that have or had access to the means to
generate revenue via citations. Including municipalities without such
means would artificially depress measures of fines and fees activity by
spuriously conflating municipalities that have the means for processing
and collecting fines and fees and municipalities that lack the means altogether. The former theoretically face incentives to pursue fines and
fees revenue and have the means to respond to such incentives whereas
the latter do not. Including cities without such resources would confound our ability to measure municipal responses to incentives.
Consistent with prior empirical work, 50 we chose commonly used
measures of community characteristics and finances for our analyses.
In all analyses, fines and fees revenue—drawn from the CoG—was the
dependent variable (DV). This was represented as a percentage of general revenue. The primary independent variables (IV) were years and
years squared, which capture the fines and fees trend before, during,
and after the Great Recession. The years variable is a simple integer
count, beginning with zero, of the number of years in the panel. The
year 2005 is coded as zero, 2006 is coded as one, 2007 is coded as two,
and so forth. Years squared is then the created by mathematically
squaring the year variable.
Taken together, these two variables enable us to measure whether
there is a curvilinear trend in fines and fees revenue that comports with
the Great Recession. By itself, time is a linear variable that enables us to
measure whether there is a linear trend in the fines and fees data across
the years measured, and if so, whether that trend is increasing or decreasing. Time squared measures whether there is a curve in the trend,
and if so, the direction of the curve. Interpreted together, the variables
can indicate the magnitude of the trend and the point in time at which a
trend changes, if, in fact, it does change.
An alternate approach is to replace the trend variables with indicator variables representing each year in the panel. Among other advantages, this method—unlike the use of trend variables—provides
precise estimates of the outcome variable for each year as compared to
the first year in the panel (assuming that the first year is used as the

thresholds are flagged as spurious and replaced/imputed. Imputations are made by consulting
alternative data sources or estimating a data point by inferring from another year and adjusting
for growth or inferring from a similar municipality.
50. See Hummel, supra note 20; Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20; see also Singla et al.,
supra note 25; Su, supra note 1; Sances & You, supra note 47.
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comparison). In combination, the coefficients can also be used to discern a trend in the outcome variable, similar to the trend variables described above. As for those variables, the trend in fines and fees generation across the years studied proved to be rather smooth (as illustrated
below), rather than a series of peaks and valleys. This made it fitting to
use time trend variables. 51 Both approaches come with advantages, so
we present both below.
Control variables in the analyses were community characteristics
drawn from the ACS and the CoG: percent minority, median household
income, population size, and police expenditures. These variables have
proven important to control for in the studies discussed above, and so
we did likewise.
As Table 1 indicates, the sample cities varied significantly on every
variable in the analysis. The variable of particular interest is the percentage of revenue cities generated through fines and fees. On average,
cities generated only approximately 1% of revenue from this source, but
the percentage differed substantially throughout the sample. As for
community characteristics, the sample included very small municipalities to the nation’s largest cities. On average, almost 30% of the residents in the sample cities were people of color, and the mean household
income was just over $50,000.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE
Population
(number of
people)
Percent minority
(percentage)
Household
income (dollars)
Percent revenue
from fines/fees
(percent)
Police
expenditures
(thousands of
dollars)

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

92.00

8,550,405.00

80,047.73

286,058.35

0.00

1.00

0.29

0.26

13,521.00

162,011.00

50,155.99

16,337.58

0.00

0.96

0.01

0.02

0.00

5,423,434.00

24,687.79

142,414.86

51. The use of the time trend variable is a more parsimonious regression model, which is
generally a desirable feature.
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B. Analysis
The analyses used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with
random effects, which enabled us to examine the relationship between
the recession—as captured in the time variables—and fines and fees
revenue after controlling all other variables in the equation. 52 The formal regression model using time trend variables took the form:
%F/F Revenueit+1 = Ӭ0 + Ӭ1(populationit) + Ӭ2(median incomeit) +
Ӭ3(%minorityit) + Ӭ4(law enforcement spendingit) + Ӭ8(timei) +
Ӭ9(timei2) + eit
The terms for years and years squared measure the relationship between the Great Recession and fines and fees revenue. If there is a relationship between fines and fees and the recession, we should expect to
see a convex parabola with the peak at the time of the recession. This
would be captured in a positive and significant coefficient for year and
a negative and significant coefficient for year squared.
The formal model using year indicator variables took the form:
%F/F Revenueit+1 = Ӭ0 + Ӭ1(populationit) + Ӭ2(median incomeit) +
Ӭ3(%minorityit) + Ӭ4(law enforcement spendingit) + Ӭ5(2006) +

52. We also replicated the models using fixed-effects, an approach frequently used in research on this topic at the municipal, county, or judicial district level. See, e.g., Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 31; Park, supra note 30; Siân Mughan, Fine and Fee Revenues, Local Courts and
Judicial Elections: The Role of Financial and Political Institutions in Extractive Revenue Practices
in U.S. Cities 15 (May 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392412 [https://perma.cc/T49Y-NLCB]. This analysis exploits the panel
nature of the data and controls for time-invariant variables not included in the regression equation. All non- or quasi-experimental research suffers from omitted variable bias, wherein some
variable not present in the equation may be significantly related to the outcome variable and confound the relationship between the IV and the DV. See Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research, 22 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 341 (2005). Fixed-effects
control for time-invariant variables not present in the analysis, but they do not control omitted
time-varying variables. Thus, compared to a traditional OLS regression, fixed-effects greatly improve the estimate of the relationship between the IV and DV by establishing a more isolated correlation between the two. Josef Bruderl & Volker Ludwig, Fixed-Effects Panel Regression, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 327, 331 (Henry Best & Christof Wolf
eds., 2015). Fixed-effects regression “discards the between variation and infers the causal effect
from within the variation only,” but it is still not technically causal. Id. at 331. The disadvantage to
fixed-effects analysis is its restriction on the effects of a variable—time, in this case—to vary by
sampled unit—municipality, in this case. Random effects models, conversely, allow for this.
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange testing indicated a random effects model was more appropriate under
ƿŎīܶĝŔƩĝǇŶƱƿĀŸĝīƱܶ܅ԁڋڅڎۮڈڈܶݛܶڇ۴ܶۮڌڈƦܶڅܶݛ۴ܶۮ܆څڅڅƱƂܶǤīܶƩīƦƂƩƿܶƿŎƂƱīܶƩīƱǇŭƿƱܶĜīŭƂǤ۴ܶOƂǤīǣīƩܶۮǤīܶĀŭƱƂܶ
report fixed-effects results in footnotes 54 and 55, infra.
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Ӭ6(2007) + Ӭ7(2008) + Ӭ8(2009) + Ӭ9(2010) + Ӭ10(2011) + Ӭ11(2012) +
Ӭ12(2013) + Ӭ13(2014) + Ӭ14(2015) + Ӭ15(2016) + eit
The variables of interest in this analysis are the time variables, 2006
through 2016. Each is compared to the year 2005, which is omitted to
facilitate the comparison. If there is a relationship between fines and
fees and the recession, we should expect to see the largest coefficients
during the recession, followed by coefficients decreasing in magnitude
in subsequent years. 53
III. RESULTS
In examining whether there is a relationship between fines and fees
activity and the Great Recession, Figure 1 provides perhaps the clearest
illustration of the relationship. From 2005 to 2017, the peak of fines and
fees revenue collection occurred during the years 2009 and 2010, which
corresponds to the Great Recession. According to Rich, 54 the recession
began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, but the effects continued to be felt for years after. 55 Indeed, Piskorski and Seru estimate
that regions “that recovered to pre-crisis levels took on average four to

53. In addition to these models, we ran a similar interrupted time series model with regression terms measuring intercepts and slopes at the time of and after the recession. See JUDITH D.
SINGER & JOHN B. WILLETT, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS, ch. 6 (2003). Results were very
similar to those of the first regression model described in the analysis section. We also ran the
random effects model with time trend variables in a multilevel analysis with random slopes and
intercepts for time. See JOOP HOX, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS (2002);
Joop J. Hox, Multilevel Analyses of Grouped and Longitudinal Data, in MODELING LONGITUDINAL AND
MULTILEVEL DATA: PRACTICAL ISSUES, APPLIED APPROACHES AND SPECIFIC EXAMPLES (Todd D. Little,
Kai U. Schnabel & Jürgen Baumert eds., 2000). Results were almost identical to those reported
below. Finally, we ran multiple models that examined different alignments between time and fines
and fees revenue. The first treated time and revenue contemporaneously, and the second shifted
fines and fees revenue ahead by one year. The first one assumed that municipalities responded
immediately to economic conditions and adjusted municipal ordinance activities to generate income. The second, following Hummel, supra note 20 and Su, supra note 1, assumed the responses
of municipalities were not immediate, and instead conditions within a given fiscal year strongly
influenced subsequent fiscal year revenue-raising efforts in non-tax revenue sources, namely ordinance citations. Goodness of fit statistics indicated a slightly better fit for the first model. That is
what we report below. All of the alternative models described here are available from the authors.
54. Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED.RSRV.HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org
/essays/great_recession_of_200709[https://perma.cc/F7MM-WHE5].
55. See Finn E. Kydland & Carlos E.J.M. Zarazaga, Fiscal Sentiment and the Weak Recovery from
the Great Recession: A Quantitative Exploration, 79 J. MONETARY ECON. 109 (2016).
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five years from the depths of the Great Recession.” 56 This estimate corresponds to the trend in Figure 1. The peak of fiscal stress is the peak of
fines and fees revenue generation, and as the economy—particularly
property values (and corresponding property tax revenue)—recovered,
fines and fees revenue declined.
FIGURE 1
AVERAGE FINES AND FEES REVENUE BY YEAR
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Of course, the difference between the lowest point and the peak is
only 0.17 percentage points, but the regression results from Model 1 in
Table 2 indicate that the trend is statistically significant. The variables
of interest are time and time squared, which must be interpreted in
tandem to understand the results. The coefficient for time is positive,
indicating that the initial slope of fines and fees revenue is positive. The
coefficient for time squared, however, is negative, indicating that at
some point the trend curves downward. The graph indicates that the
inflection occurred in 2009/2010. This is confirmed empirically by the
equation -Ӭ1/2*Ӭ2, where Ӭ1 equals the coefficient for time and Ӭ2
equals the coefficient for time squared. This equation empirically indicates the inflection point in curvilinear trends. In our analysis, the conditional product of the equation—that is, the product after controlling
for other variables in the equation—is 4.2, which essentially corresponds to calendar year (CY) 2009 (in the analysis, time is scaled so that
2005 equals 0, 2006 equals 1, and so forth). Recall, however, that in the
regression analysis the fines and fees revenues are shifted ahead one

56. Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade After Lehman 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25403, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working
_papers/w25403/w25403.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U8K-49EW].
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year (e.g., CY 2006 corresponds to revenue year (RY) 2007, CY 2007 corresponds to RY 2008, and so forth). This means the peak of the time
trend corresponds to CY 2009 and RY 2010.57
This is also illustrated with Model 2 in Table 2. As hypothesized
above, coefficients beginning with 2006 increase in magnitude until
reaching the largest numbers in CYs 2008 and 2009 (RYs 2009 and 2010)
and then generally decreasing again, albeit irregularly, to CY 2016 (RY
2017). 58 Thus, the results from Models 1 and 2 confirm the trend present
in Figure 1: fines and fees revenue peaked at the height of the Great Recession and receded as the recession also receded. In plain terms, this
means that when municipal fiscal stress was at its greatest point, cities
took in the greatest share of fines and fees revenue, and as the fiscal
stress waned, the percentage of fines and fees revenue decreased.

57. In the fixed-effects analysis, the results are almost identical: time coefficient = .027, p =
0.010; time2 coefficient = -.003, p = .001.
58. In the fixed-effects analysis, the results are almost identical. 2008 coefficient = .089, p =
0.003. 2009 coefficient = -.084, p = .011. For years before and after 2008–09, the coefficients are
gradually smaller.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINES AND FEES
REVENUE AND THE GREAT RECESSION
Model 1
Coef.
SE
p
1.399 0.082 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.141

Intercept
Population
Percent
minority
-0.037 0.039 0.344
Income
0.000 0.000 0.557
Police
expenditures
0.000 0.000 0.215
Time
0.025 0.010 0.011
2
-0.003 0.001 0.001
Time
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Note: Standard errors are clustered by city.

Model 2
Coef.
SE
p
1.297 0.081 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.106
0.237 0.152
0.000 0.000

0.119
0.772

0.000 0.000

0.192

0.017
0.068
0.090
0.089
0.079
0.064
0.022
-0.210
0.020
-0.059
-0.045

0.445
0.024
0.003
0.007
0.018
0.067
0.533
0.049
0.791
0.117
0.398

0.022
0.030
0.030
0.033
0.033
0.035
0.035
0.107
0.074
0.038
0.053

Decreasing fines and fees percentages could, of course, be a more
mathematical phenomenon than a decision by city officials to engage in
less municipal ordinance enforcement as the economy improved. For
example, fines and fees revenue—the numerator in the fines and fees
percentage above—could have remained somewhat constant over time
while general revenue—the denominator—could have decreased due to
the recession and then gradually increased during the recovery.
We tested for that possibility by examining trends in the dollar
amounts collected through fines and fees. We used the same basic random effects models described above, using fines and fees dollar
amounts as the outcome variable and controlling only for population,
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since this is a descriptive exercise. This analysis also does not shift the
fines and fees revenue ahead by year. As Table 3 illustrates, the results
in both models show a curvilinear trend to the amount of money raised
through fines and fees (the coefficients here are interpreted just as in
Table 2). This suggests that the results reported in Table 2 are not primarily a mathematical phenomenon.
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS EXAMINING FINES AND FEES
DOLLAR AMOUNTS OVER TIME

Intercept
Population
Time
Time2
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Model 1
Coef.
SE
-3917.741 1719.248
0.078
0.024
97.246 24.712
-7.280
1.710

Model 2
p
Coef.
SE
p
0.023 -3930.870 1736.857 0.024
0.001
0.078
0.024 0.001
0.000
0.000
61.818 33.280 0.063
137.255 44.986 0.002
246.369 56.563 0.000
346.663 71.884 0.000
400.657
71.439 0.000
372.213 84.572 0.000
362.450 132.202 0.006
224.845 148.567 0.130
158.727 138.611 0.252
146.474 141.392 0.300
254.276 163.787 0.121
212.574 130.873 0.104

A final note about the results in Table 2: although the community
characteristics of percent minority and household income were not of
primary interest here, it is nonetheless interesting that neither proved
to be significantly related to fines and fees revenue. This is contrary to a
number of articles finding that communities with greater percentages
of minorities or persons with low income took in more revenue through
fines and fees. 59 It remains an open question whether the generation of
fines and fees shows racial bias, as Shoub et al. suggest, 60 or, as Sances
and You conclude, “[o]ne interpretation of our results is that cash-

59. Mughan, supra note 52, at 19; Noli Brazil, The Unequal Spatial Distribution of City Government
Fines: The Case of Parking Tickets in Los Angeles, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 823 (2018); see also Brandi Blesset &
Richard C. Box, Sharecropper Finance: Using the Justice System as a Public Revenue Source, 18 PUB.
INTEGRITY 113 (2016); Sances & You, supra note 47; Singla et al., supra note 25; Su, supra note 1.
60. Kelsey Shoub, Leah Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach, Fines,
Fees, Forfeitures, and Disparities: A Link Between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities in Policing,
0 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 21–22 (2020), https://fbaum.unc.edu/articles/PSJ-2020-Fines.pdf [https://perma.cc
/K466-MMN3].
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strapped cities target poor and minority voters simply because they are
less likely to complain and not due to any inherent bias.” 61
IV. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Although the percent minority and income results in Table 2 were
inconsistent with many prior studies, our primary findings are consistent with earlier research discerning a relationship between fiscal
stress and fines and fees revenue. 62 Our findings are distinctive because
of the large, national sample, long time span, and the occurrence of a
significant recession in the middle of the study period. The recession
proved particularly revealing because of the economic recovery that followed the recession. It enabled us to allow for two possibilities. In the
first, if municipal ordinance enforcement is primarily driven by a public
health and safety motivation, there is little reason to expect to see the
trend in decreasing fines and fees revenue in the post-recessionary period. 63 In contrast, the second possibility contemplates municipal code
enforcement motivated primarily by revenue generation, which would
be manifest in a fines and fees revenue trend tied to the economic trend
of the recession. That is indeed what we found.
Of course, city leaders and municipal judges routinely deny revenue
motivations. 64 For example, when municipal courts in Georgia began
intercepting state income tax refunds of people who failed to pay traffic
tickets or other court fines, Atlanta municipal court judge Gary E. Jackson defended the scheme as a means to protect public safety. “We’re not
here to raise money,” he said. “Our job is public safety.” 65
In rare moments of candor, however, some public officials
acknowledge revenue motivations. Warwick, Georgia, for example,
boasts a new police headquarters and a renovated community center

61. Sances & You, supra note 47, at 1093.
62. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20; Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 31; Park, supra note 33; Su, supra note 1.
63. See Hummel, supra note 20 (suggesting public safety concerns have a significant and larger positive effect on the issuance of traffic tickets than budget concerns).
64. See, e.g., Maciag, supra note 3. In Seat Pleasant, Maryland, population 4,800, Police Chief
Devan Martin defended his almost $4 million in fines revenue—much of it from speed and redlight cameras—by insisting: “The purpose of the program is not for the potential financial revenue
that’s generated from it . . . . Our only purpose is to curb behavior to improve traffic safety and
public safety.” Maciag, supra note 3.
65. Teegardin, supra note 40.
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that also functions as a municipal court. 66 It is a small town with less
than 500 residents and a small business tax base. 67 The town’s upgrades
were paid for by fines and fees: “‘We had the opportunity to generate
revenue on Highway 300,’ explained City Councilman Ronnie Fennell.
‘And that’s what we did.’ . . . The city generated $3,113 for every [person]
living in its borders . . . . ‘I knew what revenue was being generated,’
Councilman Fennell said. ‘And let me tell you something. I liked it.’” 68
In another example, when Jonesboro, Georgia, topped the list of
traffic ticket revenue generators in an analysis by the Atlanta JournalConstitution, a “city councilman said he fear[ed] the priority [was] making money, not serving the community.”69 “I don’t know if it’s to ‘protect
and serve’ or to ‘collect and serve,’” said city Councilman Robby L. Wiggins. “A lot of times, that’s what it seems like to me.”70
James Tignanelli, president of the Police Officers Association of
Michigan union, similarly noted, “When elected officials say, ‘We need
more money,’ they can’t look to the department of public works to raise
revenues, so where do they find it? Police departments.” 71 Police Chief
Michael Reaves of Utica, Michigan, likewise observed, “When I first
started in this job 30 years ago, police work was never about revenue
enhancement, but if you’re a chief now, you have to look at whether
your department produces revenues.” 72
As Ginkowski described, revenue-raising motivations distort law
enforcement priorities away from protecting public health and safety. 73
These motivations also run counter to court decisions about the revenue
motivation in code enforcement. 74 Yet, courts have found that monetary sanctions may “at least pay the cost of enforcement of ordinances
and regulations” and “be imposed to effect compliance and deter viola-

66. Andria Simmons, Some Rural Georgia Towns Policing for Profit, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 8, 2015),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/some-rural-georgia-towns-policing-for-profit/wdYjcTlZsqUo8Px07C48VJ/
[https://perma.cc/Q6C4-2776].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Traffic Tickets, supra note 40.
70. Traffic Tickets, supra note 40.
71. George Hunter, More Tickets in Hard Times, CAR & DRIVER (Feb. 1, 2009), https://
www.caranddriver.com/features/a15148830/more-tickets-in-hard-times/ [https://perma.cc/FM68U7CU].
72. Id.
73. See Ginkowski, supra note 10.
74. Vill. of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (indicating that
“[t]he primary purpose of an ordinance cannot be the raising of revenue in lieu of taxation. . .”);
State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 201 N.W.2d 778, 781 n.1 (Wis. 1972) (indicating that “[r]evenue
production is not a legitimate basis for imposing a fine.”).
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tions.” 75 Thus, legal reform may be complicated, but it is possible. The
framework provided by Carpenter et al. proves particularly helpful to
this end. 76 Their framework describes state-level reforms that may assist
in removing the financial incentives that can compel municipal taxation
by citation. Such an approach would be a more systematic method of
reform rather than advocating for change at the city level.
Likely one of the most significant reforms would be to eliminate
municipal courts, which, unlike state courts, may have financial interests in the outcomes of the cases they hear. The structure of municipal
courts requires self-financing through either fees attached to the cases
they hear or budget allocations from municipalities. Both financing
methods leave municipal courts open to pressure from municipal leaders to generate fines revenue through more convictions. State courts
lack this structure, and as a result generally have greater financial independence.
State-level reforms can also (a) reduce municipalities’ need for fines
and fees revenue, (b) limit municipalities’ control over revenue collected
by municipal courts, and (c) safeguard those courts’ independence. Taking each in turn, states can reduce municipalities’ demand for fines and
fees revenue by capping fines and fees as a percentage of a municipality’s budget and giving municipalities greater flexibility in raising revenue. The first of those is arguably the most important. If municipalities
cannot keep fines and fees revenue above a certain cap or must allocate
revenue raised by their courts to school or hospital funds, this limits
their financial incentive to pursue such revenue streams.
As for flexibility in raising revenue, greater diversity of municipal
revenue sources reduces the need to rely on a particular source, especially during times of fiscal stress. Indeed, Deller and Watson’s analysis
found that cities with greater economic diversity saw greater economic
stability during the Great Recession. 77 To support their activities, municipal governments generally rely on a variety of income sources. Their
main source is taxes, primarily property taxes. “Excise taxes targeting
specific transactions (e.g., tobacco and alcohol)” or groups (tourists’
meals, hotels, and rental cars) are popular as well. 78 Municipal sales taxes generate small proportions of municipal revenue. 79 Revenue also
comes from fees (such as those associated with business licenses), ser75. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d at 508.
76. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21.
77. Steven Deller & Philip Watson, Did Regional Economic Diversity Influence the Effects of the
Great Recession?, 54 ECON. INQUIRY 1824, 1832 (2016).
78. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fines: The Folly of Conflating the Power to Fine with the Power to
Tax, 62 VILL. L. REV. 925, 930 (2017).
79. Id. at 930, 940–945.
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vice charges (the costs governments charge for providing services like
waste collection), 80 and grants or other transfers of money from other
governments. 81 Some municipalities generate revenue through public
enterprises, such as utilities. 82 Cities with such enterprises often have
lower property tax rates because utility revenue acts as a substitute for
other types of revenue generation. 83 During the 2009 recession, for example, increasing fees on water, sewer, and waste collection was the
most frequently used method of generating revenue in Illinois cities
that provided such services. 84
Specific to the primary source of municipal funding—property taxes—limitations on this form of “revenue generation may be externally
imposed . . . through constitutional or statutory requirements intended
to provide taxpayer relief—a relatively recent but widespread practice.” 85 Lacking diverse revenue sources, localities experiencing fiscal
stress who are unwilling to cut services or reduce spending may opt to
“increase reliance on fees and fines generated through the exercise of
the police power to fill the revenue gap.” 86
To limit municipalities’ control over revenue collected by municipal
courts, state reform could include prohibiting municipalities from
budgeting for court revenue to discourage dependence on it. Budgeting
for court revenue is widely practiced by cities and has now become a
prominent part of an ongoing case in Doraville, Georgia. 87 The Atlanta
suburb of a little more than 10,000 citizens became notorious for its
revenue-generating speed traps and housing code enforcement cases. 88
Each year, the suburb budgeted “between 17 and 30[%]of [its] overall ex80. Id. at 929.
81. Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://
perma.cc/2W35-FUBG].
82. See, e.g., Theodore J. Stumm & Aman Khan, Effects of Utility Enterprise Fund Subsidization on
Municipal Taxes and Expenditures, 28 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 103 (1996); Dick M. Carpenter II, Kyle
Sweetland & Jennifer McDonald, A Case Study of Municipal Taxation by Citation, CRIM. JUST. POL.
REV. 1 (2021).
83. Stumm & Khan, supra note 82, at 104.
84. Norman Walzer & Andy Blanke, Municipal Fiscal Responses in the Post-Recession Era, 3 ILL.
MUN. POL’Y J. 67, 73 (2018).
85. Wigfall Robinson, supra note 78, at 929.
86. Id. at 931.
87. Police Must Serve and Protect, Not Ticket to Collect, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case
/doraville-ticketing/ [https://perma.cc/GSB3-E2Y9] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
88. Simmons, supra note 2; Christine Fonville, Fines and Fees: Is Doraville Ticketing for Revenue? A
Lawsuit That May Move Forward States the City Is in Serious Violation, DEKALB NEIGHBOR (July 23, 2019),
https://www.mdjonline.com/neighbor_newspapers/dekalb/is-doraville-ticketing-for-revenue-alawsuit-that-may-move-forward-states-the-city-is/article_3bfc5a8e-a96d-11e9-b891-0f20afc94d8f.html
[https://perma.cc/5PMC-XYKF].
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pected revenue [to] come from fines and fees issued by its police officers and code inspectors.” 89 A 2015 Doraville newsletter bragged that “averaging nearly 15,000 cases and bringing in over $3 million annually,”
Doraville’s court system “contributes heavily to the city’s bottom line.”90
Combined with other reforms we discuss here, prohibiting cities from
such budgeting could significantly reduce revenue-generating incentives in fines and fees.
Turning to safeguarding courts’ independence, states can guarantee courts funding in their laws so that courts do not have to depend on
municipalities for support. States can also require municipal courts to
function separately from the political—that is, legislative and executive—branches of municipal government. Among other practices, this
may entail preventing city councils and mayors from appointing or removing judges; barring mayors or their designees from sitting as judges; organizing prosecutors and other law enforcement officers in separate offices from court personnel; and physically removing courts from
police departments.
Likely the best-known example of a need for separation comes from
Ferguson, Missouri, where city leaders urged the appointed police chief
and municipal court judge to make maximizing revenue their priority
and worked in league with them to meet significant budget increases in
revenue from citations. 91 The quintessential need for separation, however, is in Ohio and Louisiana’s mayors’ court systems. “Mayor’s courts
are local courts that hear traffic and local ordinance violations.” 92 Unlike
traditional municipal courts presided over by a judge, cases in mayor’s
courts are decided by the mayor or their designee—the same person responsible for overseeing the city’s finances. As the ACLU of Ohio concludes, such courts “operate with perverse incentives to prioritize revenue generation over delivery of justice.” 93 Since approximately 300 and
250 such courts operate in Ohio 94 and Louisiana respectively, 95 the need

89.
90.

Fonville, supra note 88.
Corally Rivera and Her Team Help Keep Administrative “Order in the Court,” 2 DORAVILLE
INSIGHT 1, 3 (2015), https://cms1files.revize.com/doravillega/Departments/Public%20Information
/spring2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RM2-J9QS].
91. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T, supra note 15.
92. Mayor’s Courts, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/en/campaigns/mayors-courts [https://
perma.cc/9HCH-H3X7] (last visited June 5, 2021); accord Mayor’s Court, LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR 3, https://
app.lla.state.la.us/llala.nsf/A6809D408B35FA9286257AB8006E9684/$FILE/Mayor%27s%20Court%
20FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F6B-BDJ3] (last updated July 2020).
93. ACLU OHIO, OFF THE RECORD: PROFITEERING AND MISCONDUCT IN OHIO’S MAYOR’S COURTS 1
(2019), https://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2019/oh-mayoraclu.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK2VCMV7].
94. Id.
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for separation between judicial and executive/legislative functions is
not trivial.
Although awareness of the issue of revenue generation through
fines and fees was once confined to periodic complaints about speed
traps and traffic tickets, 96 it has grown to much greater prominence in
recent years. Of particular concern are questions about the extent to
which cities’ use of municipal ordinance enforcement transcends public
health and safety into taxation by citation. Our empirical results suggest that there is a reason for such concern. This problem is not, however, an intractable one. The reforms we outline above—along with
others proposed by Carpenter et al., 97 the Fines and Fees Justice Center, 98 and others 99—can go a long way to ameliorating a legal problem
that is ultimately of our own making.
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